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TRIBUTE
TRIBUTE TO JUSTICE JAMES C. NELSON
The Montana Law Review dedicates the current issue to the
Honorable James C. Nelson, Justice of the Montana Supreme
Court. The editors recognize and thank Justice Nelson for his par-
ticipation and enthusiastic help in organizing the 2006 Honorable
James R. Browning Symposium, The Right to Privacy.1 The Re-
view also thanks Justice Nelson on behalf of students of The Uni-
versity of Montana School of Law for his frequent visits to law
school events, and for his intense and sincere interest in students'
legal and ethical education. His semester teaching first-year
criminal law while sitting as a supreme court justice demon-
strates his remarkable dedication to Montana's law students.
This symposium issue presents the perfect opportunity to cel-
ebrate Justice Nelson. No jurist has been more influential in de-
fining the contours of Montana's constitutional right to privacy.2
And no jurist has been a more courageous and vigilant protector of
ordinary Montanans' constitutional freedoms. The drafters of the
Montana Constitution's Declaration of Rights not only specifically
enumerated the individual rights Montana citizens consider sa-
cred (including the right to privacy), but also sought to safeguard
those rights from erosion by political forces and advancing tech-
nologies. 3 Justice Nelson and his colleagues on the court have
1. U. of Mont. Sch. of L. (Oct. 11-13, 2006).
2. "The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and
shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest." Mont. Const.
art. II, § 10.
3. Montana Constitutional Convention, 1971-1972 vol. 5, 1681 (Margaret S. Warden
et al. eds., Mont. Legis. 1981). See also Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128, 141 (Mont. 2002)
(Trieweiler, J.) ("[Tihe authors of our Constitution . . . went to great and conspicuous
lengths to preserve [the right to privacy] in the face of what they correctly anticipated
would be increasing political pressure and the developing technological ability to erode it.");
Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 382 (Mont. 1999) (Nelson, J.) ("[Nior may the state in-
fringe individual liberty and personal autonomy because of majoritarian demands.. .. ");
1
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often declined to follow other state and federal courts' interpreta-
tions of privacy, recognizing that Montanans enjoy greater privacy
rights than are recognized by other states or by the federal gov-
ernment. 4 Montana's jurisprudence of privacy is unique.
The right to privacy has been called the "right to be let
alone."5 Montana's emphasis on that tradition of personal privacy
is sometimes mischaracterized as simply hostility to government,
exemplified by newspaper headlines spotlighting misfits and
fringe-groups. 6 To the contrary, Montana's privacy tradition is
rooted in the noble values of tolerance and respect. Historian K.
Ross Toole explained that "because Montanans are so few and the
land is so large..., the Montanan is unusually mobile, unusually
informed about what his neighbors are doing, and.., unusually
tolerant."7 Or, as one Montana judge bluntly put it, "Montanans
generally mind their own business"-"a rule . . . [that] does not
need to be supported by reference to fancy law review articles."
8
Larry M. Elison & Dennis NettikSimmons, Right ofPrivacy, 48 Mont. L. Rev. 1, 11, 27-28
(1987); William C. Rava, Student Author, Toward a Historical Understanding of Montana's
Privacy Provision, 61 Albany L. Rev. 1681, 1711 (1998) ("Montana's right of privacy is an
express countermajoritarian (or, more accurately, counter-legislative or governmental) pro-
cedural safeguard.").
4. E.g. Dorwart, 58 P.3d at 142 (Nelson & Trieweiler, JJ., specially concurring) ("[T]he
greater guarantees of individual rights afforded by Montana's Constitution may be neither
bounded nor frustrated by federal court decisions which, with seeming increasing fre-
quency, are weakening similar protections of the federal constitution."); Armstrong, 989
P.2d at 367 (Nelson, J.); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 125 (Mont. 1997) (Nelson, J.); State
v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 192 (Mont. 1997) (Nelson, J.); see also Trankel v. Dept. of Military
Affairs, 938 P.2d 614, 623 (Mont. 1997) (Trieweiler, J.) ('[Montana's constitutional right of
full legal redress] leaves no room for erosion based on what federal courts or the courts of
other states would do."); State v. Schwarz, 136 P.3d 989, 992 (Mont. 2006) (Leaphart, J.)
("[Wie now opt not to march in step with our sister states and federal courts on the issue.");
State v. Elison, 14 P.3d 456 (Mont. 2000) (Reguier, J.).
5. E.g. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts 29 (2d ed., Callaghan & Co.
1880); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890);
Olmstead v. U.S., 227 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Welsh v. Roehm, 241
P.2d 816, 819 (Mont. 1952); Dorwart, 58 P.3d at 141; James C. Nelson, Keynote Address:
The Right to Privacy, 68 Mont. L. Rev. 257 (2007).
6. E.g. Tom Kenworthy, Radical Reputation Bedevils Mont., USA Today A3 (Apr. 8,
2002) (N[T]he stereotype of Montana [is] as an incubator for weird zealots and anti-govern-
ment movements.").
7. K. Ross Toole, Montana: An Uncommon Land 257 (U. of Okla. Press 1959) (quoted
in Scott A. Fisk, Student Author, The Last Best Place to Die: Physician-Assisted Suicide
and Montana's Constitutional Right to Personal Autonomy Privacy, 59 Mont. L. Rev. 301,
328 (1998) ("[Montanans'] uncommon tolerance lies at the heart of the express right to
privacy in Montana.")).
8. Or. on Mots. for S.J. at 11, Gryczan v. State, 1996 Mont. Dist. Lexis 746 at **12-13
(Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Feb. 16, 1996) (Sherlock, J.) (quoted in Fisk, supra n. 7, at 328).
2
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Despite potential political repercussions, Justice Nelson has
consistently interpreted the privacy clause of the Montana Consti-
tution in a manner consonant with the intention of Convention
delegates: that Montanans may live their lives with a baseline
measure of freedom and respect. As noted by a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, "the right to be let alone [may be] ...
the most important right of them all."9 Due in large part to Jus-
tice Nelson, Montanans' right to privacy-to be let alone-is a
fundamental right.10 And the government's infringement of that
right is now a recognized cause of action for damages, giving the
people a mechanism to hold the State accountable to the constitu-
tion's promise.11
Justice Nelson's jurisprudence has not gone unnoticed. Re-
garding the privacy of search and seizure, Nelson wrote the major-
ity opinion in State v. Siegal, holding that police thermal imaging
of a defendant's outbuilding constituted a search that implicated
privacy and search-and-seizure protections of the Montana Con-
stitution. 12 Justice Nelson's opinion was written when most fed-
eral courts considering the question-including the District of
Montana13-had come to the opposite conclusion in relation to the
federal Constitution.14 Four years after Siegal, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed those lower federal courts. In Kyllo v. U.S., Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court, applied an analysis similar to Nel-
son's, holding that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the thermal information emanating from their homes, an expec-
tation that protects citizens from unreasonable government intru-
sion.'
5
9. Montana Constitutional Convention, 1971-1972 vol. 5, 1681 (Margaret S. Warden
et al. eds., Mont. Legis. 1981).
10. E.g. Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 122 (Mont. 1997);Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d
364, 367 (Mont. 1999).
11. Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128, 138 (Mont. 2002); id. at 147-48 (Nelson &
Trieweiler, JJ., specially concurring).
12. State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 183-84, 191-92 (Mont. 1997); Mont. Const. art. II,
§§ 10, 11.
13. U.S. v. Depew, 992 F. Supp. 1209, 1212 (D. Mont. 1998), aff'd, 210 F.3d 1061 (9th
Cir. 2000).
14. E.g. U.S. v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669-70
(7th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1994); U.S. v. Ford, 34 F.3d
992, 995-97 (11th Cir. 1994); Kyllo v. U.S., 190 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 533
U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
15. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV). Compare Siegal, 934 P.2d at
191 ("[We conclude that persons have an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy in the
heat signatures of activities [in their homes and enclosed structures] ..... [This expecta-
tion is one which society in this State is willing to recognize as objectively reasonable.")
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Justice Nelson has perhaps most affected the State's privacy
jurisprudence in the area of personal autonomy. 16 As a result of
cases like Armstrong v. State' 7 and Gryczan v. State' 8- both Nel-
son-authored opinions-Montana's right to privacy now more fully
encompasses personal autonomy and decision-making. The Arm-
strong plaintiffs, including a physician's assistant, challenged a
Montana statute requiring that all abortions be performed only by
licensed physicians.' 9 Arguing under the federal Constitution in
federal court, the plaintiffs lost at the U.S. Supreme Court.
20
In the plaintiffs' subsequent state constitutional challenge,
the Montana Supreme Court held that the right to privacy en-
shrined in Montana's Constitution "broadly protects a woman's
right of procreative autonomy-i.e., here, the right to seek and to
obtain a specific lawful medical procedure, a pre-viability abor-
tion, from a health care provider of her choice." Nelson, writing
for the majority, held that the "right of procreative autonomy" in-
cludes the right to choose an appropriate healthcare provider on
the basis of medical standards, not politics-even in the politically
charged area of abortion.21 Once again, Montana's constitutional
right to privacy, as interpreted by Justice Nelson and his col-
leagues on the Montana Supreme Court, set Montanans' right to
reproductive autonomy well above the federal high-water mark of
Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, and far above the lower ebb enunciated recently
in Gonzales v. Carhart.22
with Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. at 40 ("Where... the Government uses a device that is not in
general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknow-
able without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unrea-
sonable without a warrant.").
16. Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 367 (Mont. 1999); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112,
125 (Mont. 1997).
17. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 367.
18. Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 125.
19. Ch. 321, 1995 Mont. Laws § 2 (codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 50-20-109 (1995)) (su-
perseded by Mont. Code Ann. § 50-20-109 (2005)).
20. Armstrong v. Mazurek, 906 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mont. 1995), vacated, 94 F.3d 566 (9th
Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S. 968 (1997).
21. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 367 (Mont. 1999).
22. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (holding that a right to privacy includes a
qualified right to choose an abortion); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 873, 879 (1992) (upholding Roe, but allowing states to regulate pre-viability abortions
when such regulations do not present an "undue burden" on the woman); Gonzales v. Car-
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In Gryczan, Justice Nelson, writing for the court's majority,
held that "[t]he right of consenting adults, regardless of gender, to
engage in private, non-commercial sexual conduct strikes at the
very core of Montana's constitutional right of individual privacy"
and that a state law criminalizing such conduct was unconstitu-
tional. 23 The court noted that "consenting adults expect that
neither the state nor their neighbors will be co-habitants of their
bedrooms." 24 Gryczan was decided when the U.S. Supreme
Court's Bowers v. Hardwick decision-upholding a similar Geor-
gia "anti-sodomy" law-was still the federal law of the land.25 Six
years after Gryczan, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lawrence v.
Texas, which articulated an understanding of privacy closer to
that emphasized by Justice Nelson in Gryczan.26 Justice Ken-
nedy's Lawrence opinion cited Gryczan among only a handful of
state court cases.
27
Justice Nelson also guarded the integrity of individuals' right
to privacy in Associated Press, Inc. v. Montana Department of Rev-
enue.28 Concurring, Justice Nelson argued against state prece-
dent that corporations also enjoy the constitutional right to pri-
vacy.29 Highlighting the "individual" in Article II, section 10's "in-
dividual right of privacy," Justice Nelson argued that the right
applies only to humans. 30 Three years later, the Montana Su-
preme Court unanimously adopted Nelson's Associated Press anal-
ysis.3 1 That analysis is particularly important when courts must
balance the right to privacy against the "right to know," another
express constitutional guarantee that protects Montanans' right
to see the inner workings of state and local governments, includ-
23. Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 125.
24. Id. at 122.
25. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled, Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
26. Compare Gryczan 942 P.2d at 126 ("[W]hile legislative enactments may reflect the
will of the majority, and, arguably, may even respond to perceived societal notions of what
is acceptable conduct in a moral sense, there are certain rights so fundamental that they
will not be denied to a minority no matter how despised by society.") with Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 578 ("The State cannot demean [the plaintiff and his partner's] existence or control
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.").
27. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570-71.
28. Associated Press, Inc. v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 4 P.3d 5, 13 (Mont. 2000) (Nelson &
Leaphart, JJ., specially concurring).
29. Mt. Sts. Tel. & Telegraph Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Serv. Reg., 634 P.2d 181 (Mont. 1981),
overruled, Great Falls Trib. v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Commn., 82 P.3d 876, 883 (Mont. 2003).
30. Associated Press, 4 P.3d at 13 (Nelson & Leaphart, JJ., specially concurring).
31. Great Falls Trib., 82 P.3d at 883 (citing Associated Press, 4 P.3d at 14-21 (Nelson &
Leaphart, JJ., specially concurring)).
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ing their ability to examine documents and observe delibera-
tions.
32
Montanans hold a tight rein on the government when it comes
to their privacy. The strong words of the constitutional text, the
unambiguous history of the 1972 Montana Constitutional Conven-
tion, and the corpus of state constitutional case law provide citi-
zens that control. Although strong, Montana's right to privacy is
not absolute. Narrowly tailored legislation furthering a compel-
ling state interest can trump the right to privacy.33 The State's
Constitution thus manifests practicality, another Montana trait
born of scratching out a living in rough country.
Born in Moscow, Idaho, and a graduate of George Washington
University Law School in Washington, D.C., 34 Justice Nelson has
experienced and contributed to Montana's ethos of tolerance, re-
spect, and hard-nosed practicality in the fourteen years he served
as Glacier County Attorney, 35 his nearly twenty years in private
practice in Cut Bank,36 his ten years as a member of the Montana
delegation to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws,37 and the past fourteen years since he was ap-
pointed to the Montana Supreme Court by Governor Marc
Racicot. 3
8
Because Justice Nelson is a vigilant and principled protector
of the right to privacy, a steadfast advocate of The University of
Montana School of Law and its students, and a valued and de-
pendable friend to the Montana Law Review, we dedicate this is-
sue to the Honorable James C. Nelson.
32. Mont. Const. art. II, § 9. See e.g. Associated Press, 43 P.3d at 10-11 (majority);
T.L.S. v. Mont. Advocacy Program, 144 P.3d 818, 824-25 (Mont. 2006).
33. Mont. Const. art. iI, § 10.
34. Montana Courts, "Justice James C. Nelson", http://www.montanacourts.org/su-
preme/bios/nelson.asp (accessed June 11, 2007).
35. Michael Moore, Justice Jim Nelson, Missoulian (May 7, 2000) (available at http://
www.missoulian.com/articles/2000/05/07/export43227.txt).
36. Associated Press, Regnier Won't Seek Re-Election to Supreme Court; Nelson Will,
Missoulian (July 1, 2003) (available at http://www.missoulian.com/articles/2003/07/01/
mtracker/news/45judges.txt).
37. Email from E. Edwin Eck, Dean, U. of Mont. Sch. of L. & delegate to Natl. Conf.
Commrs. Unif. St. Ls., to Daniel Browder, Co-Editor-in-Chief, Mont. L. Rev., Re: Justice
Nelson (June 7, 2007) (copy on file with Montana Law Review).
38. Jennifer McKee, Nelson, Morris Capture High Court Seats, Missoulian (Nov. 3,
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